The welcome rise of replication tests in economics has not been accompanied by a single, clear definition of replication. A discrepant replication, in current usage of the term, can signal anything from an unremarkable disagreement over methods to scientific incompetence or misconduct. This paper proposes an unambiguous definition of replication, one that reflects currently common but unstandardized use. It contrasts this definition with decades of unsuccessful attempts to standardize terminology and argues that many prominent results described as replication tests should not be described as such. Adopting this definition can improve incentives for researchers, encouraging more and better replication tests.
The problem
Social science is benefiting from a surge of interest in subjecting published research to replication tests. But economics and other social sciences have yet to clearly define what a replication is. Thus if a replication test gives discrepant results, under current usage of the term, this could mean a wide spectrum of things-from signaling a legitimate disagreement over the best methods (science), to signaling incompetence and fraud (pseudoscience). Terminology that lumps together fundamentally different things impedes scientific progress, hobbling researchers with fruitless debates and poor incentives. This paper argues that the movement for replication in social science will become stronger with clear terminology. It begins by proposing an unambiguous definition of replication. It shows that usage compatible with the proposed definition is already widespread in the literature, but so is usage that is incompatible. It then reviews decades of attempts to resolve this conceptual confusion across the social sciences, and shows how the terminology proposed here addresses the problem. The remaining sections argue that the proposed definition creates better incentives for researchers, and applies this definition to classify many recent and prominent critique papers. It concludes by arguing that the need for this terminology arises from a generational shift in how empirical social science is conducted.
A proposal to define replication and robustness
Consider the proposed definitions of replication and robustness tests in Table 1 . They are distinguished by whether or not the follow-up test should give, in expectation, exactly the same quantitative result.
What sets a replication apart
A replication test estimates parameters drawn from the same sampling distribution as those in the original study. A replication test can take two forms: A verification test means ensur-1 The "same" specification, population, or sample means the same as reported in the original paper, not necessarily what was contained in the code and data used by the original paper.
Thus for example if code used in the original paper contains an error such that it does not run exactly the regressions that the original paper said it does, new code that fixes the error is nevertheless using the "same" specifications (as described in the paper).
ing that the exact statistical analysis reported in the original paper gives materially the same results reported in the paper, either using the original dataset or remeasuring with identical methods the same traits of the same sample of subjects. 
Examples
Restricting the term replication to this meaning fits the intuitive meaning that social science borrows from natural science. Lewis et al. (1989) , for example, failed to replicate the "cold fusion" that Fleischmann and Pons (1989) Thus declaring a failure to replicate requires demonstrating that the new estimate should be quantitatively identical to the old result in expectation. An investigator claiming a "replication" bears this burden of proof, due to the special status of replication in science. Other discrepant follow-up estimates should be described by stating that the original result was not robust to certain alterations.
For example, suppose a follow-up study of the same African district 15 years after the original study tries the same experimental intervention on a new sample at the same location. The original study found a large effect, the follow-up finds none. If potential confounders change slowly over time, this would constitute re-sampling a population that is materially the samea replication test attempting to reproduce the original result. If confounders can change more quickly, the population in the follow-up is materially different; the sampling distribution for the new estimates is not the same, and the follow-up study is a robustness test (extension to new data). Thus a test of providing free mobile phones 15 years after an original study might be a test of extension to a new time period, given that the mobile communications landscape is rapidly changing in Africa. But a test of providing the same vitamin supplement in the same place 15 years later might be a replication, if the factors that shape the impact of the vitamin change very slowly. This must be shown, and the standard should be high. If the location of the follow-up study differs at all, this is certainly an extension.
How the term replication is used now
There is no settled definition of the term replication in the tradition of economics or social science in general (Wulwick 1996; Hamermesh 2007) . "The term nearly defies precise definition" (Mittelstaedt and Zorn 1984) .
Usage compatible with this proposal is widespread
Many economics journals already endorse the key goal of Table 1 : restricting the meaning of the word replication to a sense that does not include robustness tests. Authors in the American Economic Review "are expected to send their data, programs, and sufficient details to permit replication." Here, the term replication unambiguously means using the original data and code to get exactly the same results as appear in the paper. Many researchers, too, already use terminology consistent with the restricted meaning of replication in Table 1 . Summers (1991) (2011) is not a replication critique, but rather a critique of the regression functional form that we use". Albouy (2012) describes his critique of Acemoglu et al. (2001) with a different dataset as a test of "reliability", "robustness", and "sensitivity", but never suggests that the original study could not be "replicated".
Incompatible usage is also widespread
But there is no consensus meaning of the term replication. Many journals and organizations work with a definition that is irreconcilable with Table 1 and the usage in subsection 3.1. That is, they define replication so that follow-up studies can fail to replicate an original paper's findings even when the original study's code and data are correct and reproduce that study's results precisely.
Pesaran's (2003) Numerous researchers also work with a different definition than that proposed in Table 1 .
For Hamermesh (1997), economics "can never be a field where mere duplication could be of any interest. . . . The best replication studies. . . will attempt duplication as their starting point, but go far beyond that" to "try alternative methods and other specifications" or "timeseries data. . . outside the original sample period." To Kniesner (1997) , "the best replication study is a broad parameter robustness check" whose "prototypical" example alters the original study's "definition of the wage variable, pay scheme, inclusion of income taxation, instrument set, curvature, and parameterization of latent heterogeneity." Dority and Fuess (2007) 
Past attempts at a definition have not worked
The social science literature recognizes this confusion but has not resolved it. The literature is chronically afflicted with attempts to define replication. Those efforts have yielded a disappointing mess, summarized in Table 2 . It shows different terms previously proposed in the literature to describe the concepts of "replication" and "robustness" distinguished in Table 1 .
This confusion suggests three lessons.
First, Table 2 reveals an enduring need for the conceptual distinction drawn by Table 1 . There are decades of attempts, across the social sciences, to distinguish two things: studies that revisit an earlier paper by strictly reproducing its findings with the same data and methods it describes, and studies that revisit those findings by changing the data and/or methods.
Second, the word replication is routinely used to describe both kinds of studies. This occurs in every field. The attempted solution has been to use qualifiers to distinguish flavors of replication, but none of these have become standard. Thus if a 'replication' study finds a 
Why this unambiguous distinction is needed
It is imperative for social science to distinguish between the concepts of replication and robustness distinguished in Table 1 . This is because the the two concepts carry sharply different normative messages about the original research, with consequences for the field as a whole.
If a paper fails a replication test it is because there was something indisputably wrong in the original work or in the replication. At best this can mean measurement error or a minor, goodfaith oversight, and even that best case-without any suggestion of scientific misconduct-is traumatic to authors: For Levitt (2002) , a failed replication arising from an oversight in his original work was "unacceptable" and a source of "tremendous personal embarrassment". At worst, failed replications are linked to "fraud" (Trikalinos et al. 2008) and "doubts about scientific ethics" (Furman et al. 2012) . "Replication speaks to ethical professional practice,"
write Camfield and Palmer-Jones (2013), and its motive is often to "uncover error or fraud".
The American Political Science Association's policy on replication is expressed in its Guide to
Professional Ethics (APSA 2012).
But if a paper fails a robustness test, it is because the original paper exhibits a choice that is legitimately debatable. It is not beyond question what the right choice was, and divergence of opinions has nothing at all to do with "ethics" and "fraud". Robustness tests often speak of "plausible" alterations to regression specifications, but the original specifications can seem These are two fundamentally different situations. We harm scientific progress when we confuse them, as we must, by referring to both with the same word ( Table 2) . Harm can arise in two ways, by shaping the incentives of authors on both sides of debates. were run exactly as we claim, though it is certainly possible to challenge our choice." What unites these episodes is a strong concern by the original authors that readers could confuse replication tests (signifying mistakes or worse) with robustness tests (signifying legitimately arguable choices). This may be part of why the responding authors clearly feel targeted for attack rather more than they feel engaged in collaboration to advance science.
To be clear: I do not criticize these reactions, but consider them inevitable sequelae of the field's confused terminology. And confusion harms science. Misunderstood claims of failed "replications", in which the original researcher in fact did nothing indisputably wrong, "will make it much more difficult for serious policy-relevant researchers to do their job," continues
Deaton (2013). "Scholars will also be much less willing to share data than is currently the case;
doing so allows anyone who is unscrupulous enough to turn your cooperation against you."
That is bad news for social science, which has a "desperate need for replications" (Hunter
2001).
Second, confusion in the meaning of replication harms research by creating perverse incentives for those conducting replication and robustness checks. Anyone can find 'plausible' ways to change someone else's regressions so that coefficient estimates change. Casey et al. (2012) show that they could have gotten nearly any result they might have wanted, with 'plausible' alterations to their own regressions, had their hands not been tied by a pre-analysis plan.
Likewise, "if you want to debunk a paper, working through it equation by equation. . . you will eventually find something that changes" (Deaton 2013). A well-known form of this problem is that it is a simple matter to change any result into a null result by running modified versions of the same test that are underpowered by construction (Ottenbacher 1996; Hicks et al. 2014b; Bazzi and Bhavnani 2015) . Thus if the meaning of a failed replication includes cases with different specifications and data, then any empirical study can be made to "fail to replicate" by a person with a computer and sufficient determination. Ultimately, clear terminology may encourage more replication and robustness testing. Clear terms make these exercises more of an opportunity for research and less of a perceived threat to researchers.
Most prominent critiques are not replications
The definitions proposed in Table 1 6 Replication yesterday and tomorrow
he replication standard is extremely important to the further development of the discipline," writes King (1995) . For important things we need clear terms. The meaning of replication needs to be standardized just as the meaning of "statistically significant" once was.
The root of confusion about replication's meaning may lie in the changing nature of empirical investigation. Morgenstern (1951) , in his time, saw little role for repetition in economics to mimic that found in the natural sciences. This was because, for example, public statistics on industrial production in a given year are only gathered once, and cannot be infinitely remeasured like the velocity of light. Thus Finifter (1972) finds that for social science, "on reflection, the notion of identical replication in a strict one-to-one duplication is eventually abandoned as an unattainable goal", and Madden et al. (1995) agree that "literal replication is probably not possible in the social sciences." This reflects a view in which social scientists are passive and infallible observers of unique, one-off phenomena in the world outside, not fallible executors of repeatable inquiries within their own departments and offices. From this point of view, mere repetition of the same analysis on the same data is seen as "uninventive" (Kane 1984) . "Mindlessly taking the exact same data and checking to see if an author 'made a mistake' is not a useful activity in the social sciences," writes (Hamermesh 1997). This helps explain why " [t] he credo of experimental repetition never has taken hold in economics" 
Note
Replication tests Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) Feldstein (1974, 1982) Fix programming error (also contains reanalysis)
Day and Liebowitz (1998) Munnell et al. (1996) Dataset not as presented due to error in gov. dataset
McCrary ( Coding error; relevance to findings disputed
Robustness tests
Boyce and Ravallion (1991) Khan (1984) O New specifications, full data Mack and Wulwick (1991) Phillips (1958) F Nonparametric estimator (Sleeman 2011) Harrison (1998) Munnell et al. (1996) F New specification, additional variables Dai (2002 ) Mansfield et al. (2000 , 2002 F Alters assumptions of original model Joyce (2004 Joyce ( , 2006 Joyce ( , 2009 Donohue and Levitt (2001 Levitt ( , 2004 Levitt ( , 2008 F New ident. strategy, serial corr. adjustment Table 1 . (Wulwick 1996) .
Modern social science has evolved into something quite different. In particular, empirical economics today consists largely of the application of computer code to computerized datasets.
Empirical economics is acquiring important traits of computational science. In computational science, "[m]ost of the work in a modern research project is hidden in computational scripts that go to produce the reported results," writes Donoho (2010). "An article about a computational result is advertising, not scholarship. The actual scholarship is the full software environment, code and data, that produced the result." In modern empirical social science, problems within that environment are common, as Dewald et al. (1986) revealed and Table 3 here confirms. These go far beyond researcher error. Two statistical software packages ostensibly performing the same calculation can yield very different results (McCullough 2009a; Bazzi and Clemens 2013, footnote 30) , and the underlying data used by the original authors can be incorrectly constructed, through no fault of theirs (Day and Liebowitz 1998). As datasets, code, and underlying software become more complex, replication "is increasingly important because our intuition fails in high dimensions" (Baggerly and Berry 2011). In this view, repeating a set of empirical calculations exactly is replicating scientific inquiry, because the code and data are the scholarship. Replication thus conceived, far from being "not possible" (Madden et al. 1995) , is a necessary condition for science. This is a profound evolution in methods and concepts. Our terminology has not caught up with it, and many researchers have noticed. Psychologist Chris Chambers (2012) asks for an end to describing robustness tests, sometimes called "conceptual replications" (Table 2) 
